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COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ELECTIONS-THE SUFFICIENCY OF
PETITIONS SEEKING REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE*
Municipal legislation is usually enacted by the representative
legislative body of the municipality, but the state statutes may pro-
vide for the use of initiative and referendum-legislation by the
direct vote of the electors.' Taken together, initiative and referendum
provide a complete pattern for direct legislation.2 Initiative empow-
ers the voters to enact new laws. The referendum enables the voters
to repeal or veto laws passed by the legislative body of the munici-
pality. Direct participation in passing and repealing laws is democ-
racy carried to its logical limit.3 Even the most ardent proponent of
the initiative or referendum process, however, would not advocate
that all municipal legislation be enacted by resort to a popular elec-
tion.4 Elections are expensive and time consuming. The methods for
implementing referendum or initiative are cumbersome, difficult to
administer, and may be subject to abuse.5 The inefficiencies of initia-
tive and referendum demand that they be treated as an "extra-
ordinary" legislative process.
The procedure to secure the repeal of specific legislation is set out
by statute." Typically, an organized minority, usually with substantial
interest in repealing an existing ordinance, commences a referendum
by circulating a petition.7 Because the referendum is an extraordinary
remedy for repealing laws passed by the regular legislative body, the
petition must be signed by a specified number of qualified electors to
prevent the institution of a referendum at the whim of every special
* City Comm'n of Albuquerque v. State ex rel. Nichols, 405 P.2d 924 (N.M. 1965)
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-13-17, -18 (Supp. 1965).
1. See generally Crouch, The Initiative and Referendum in Cities, 37 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 491 (1947).
2. Note. Limitations on Initiative and Referendum, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1951).
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 498.
5. See Fordham & Prendergast, The Initiative and Referendum at the Municipal
Level in Ohio, 20 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 313 (1951). For state elections, see Fordham & Leach,
The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 Ohio St. L.J. 495 (1950).
6. 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.49, at 243 (3d ed. 1949) [hereinafter
cited as McQuillin].
7. 5 McQuillin § 16.60, at 268.
interest group." To prevent abuse of the referendum privilege, a
verification and examination of the petition with respect to the sign-
er's qualifications is generally provided. A referendum petition
should be held legally insufficient unless provisions are made for some
precautionary investigation of the petition.' Finally, the petition must
be filed within a specified time after the passage of the particular ordi-
nance;10 otherwise it may be assumed that the voters have an ade-
quate remedy in seeking repeal through the election of representatives
more responsive to their wishes.
The broad statutory outline is deceptively simple; but administra-
tive problems may arise from ineptitude in drafting the referendum
statute. The legislature should provide clear statutory language that
sets forth (1) who is a "qualified elector" eligible to sign the peti-
tion;" (2) the number of signatures required on the petition ;12 (3)
the time period within which the petition must be presented for filing,
and (4) who, if anyone, has authority to determine whether the
petition is in fact legally sufficient.'3 Some thought should also be
directed to the question whether a bona fide effort to secure a petition
containing the requisite number of signatures shall be sufficient, de-
spite the inclusion of a number of unqualified signatures.
14
Several of these problems arose in City Commission of 4lbuquer-
que v. State ex rel. Nichols,'5 which construed the now repealed New
8. People ex rel. Wright v. Kelly, 294 Mich. 503, 293 N.W. 865, 870 (1940).
9. 5 McQuillin § 16.63, at 274.
10. The usual period is thirty days after the adoption of the ordinance. N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 14-13-17 (Supp. 1965) ; Cal. Elections Code § 4051.
11. E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-2(K) (Supp. 1965) ; Cal. Elections Code § 100. Com-
pare Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 70-1-6 (1965) :
TO BE A QUALIFIED ELECTOR YOU MUST BE:
(a) At least twenty-one years of age.
(b) A citizen of the United States.
(c) A resident of the state of Colorado and have resided in the state at least
twelve months.
(d) A resident of the county in which you live for at least ninety days.
(e) A resident of the city or town in which you live for at least thirty days.
(f) A resident of the precinct in which you live for at least fifteen days.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-13-17 (Supp. 1965).
13. Most states provide by statute for the city clerk or some comparable officer to
examine the petition for sufficiency. E.g., Ala. Code tit. 37, § 119 (1958) (function of
board of commissioners to examine qualification of the signers) ; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 50-3906 (1947) (function of city clerk to examine petition) ; Cal. Elections Code § 4009
(city clerk to examine petition). Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-13-17 (Supp. 1965) ; Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 731.29 (Page Supp. 1965).
14. See Cal. Elections Code § 4009 (if petition is shown to be insufficient a supple-
mental petition may be filed within ten days of the date of the certificate of insufficiency).
15. 405 P.2d 924 (N.M. 1965).
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Mexico referendum statutes.16 In Nichols, the ordinance in question,
an emergency measure, provided for a gasoline tax of one cent per
gallon on gasoline sold within the city of Albuquerque. The ordinance
was adopted on December 15, 1964. On January 18, 1965, thirty-
three days later, a petition containing signatures of more than 24,500
persons was filed with the city requesting a referendum election. The
city refused to order an election. Legal proceedings were initiated
in the district court on January 22, 1965, with the filing of a petition
for an alternative writ of mandamus. The city defended on the
grounds that the referendum petition was not filed within the re-
quired time, and argued in the alternative that the writ should not be
issued until the city had, by comparing the signatures on the petition
with those on the voting register, determined the sufficiency and
validity of the petition. The trial court ordered the city to initiate pro-
ceedings to hold the election within thirty days. On appeal to the New
Mexico Supreme Court, held, Affirmed.' 7 First disposing of the filing
time issue in favor of Nichols, 8 the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that, absent explicit authorization by the legislature, the city was
without authority to make a "judicial" determination of the sufficien-
cy of the petition.' 9
The supreme court decision in Nichols had the effect of reading
out of the statute the requirement that the petition be signed by
"qualified voters." The court concluded that "the trial court having
found that the petition contained names equal to 20% of the 'qualified
voters' and having ordered the election, nothing remains to be done
by the city except to comply."' 20 The court's requirement that the
16. N.M. Laws 1919, ch. 121, art. 3, § 2, provides:
(a) No act, or ordinance, or resolution or order of the governing body of the
city shall, unless it be declared an emergency measure on the ground of urgent
public need, go into effect until thirty days after its passage. If at any time within
the thirty days, a petition signed by twenty per cent of the qualified voters is
presented to the governing body, asking that the measure in question be sub-
mitted to a vote of the people for adoption or rejection, said measure shall not go
into effect until an election shall have been held as petitioned. It shall be the duty
of the governing body of the city to provide for such election within thirty days
of the filing of the petition.
The pertinent language of N.M. Laws 1919, ch. 121, art. 3, § 3, provides:
(b) If a measure be declared an emergency measure, as provided above, it
shall go into effect at once, subject to repeal by an adverse majority at the recall
election.
17. 405 P.2d at930.
18. Nichols held that the thirty-day filing time for emergency measures did not begin
to run until five days after publication on December 18, 1964. This gave the petitioners
thirty-five days within which to file the petition. Id. at 928.
19. Id. at 930.
20. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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petition contain names equal to twenty per cent of the qualified
voters is significantly different from the statute's requirement that
the petition be signed by twenty per cent of the qualified voters.
The Nichols decision provides no satisfactory solution to the
problem of who is to authenticate the signatures on the petition. The
New Mexico Supreme Court tacitly approved the trial court's con-
clusion that the signatures would be presumed valid.2' Moreover, the
trial court had indicated that it would not conduct its own investiga-
tion of the validity of the signatures. 2 Had the Nichols opinion
stopped at this point, it might be assumed that the city would be
permitted to introduce evidence of the invalidity of the signatures to
rebut the presumption of their validity. However, the supreme court
went on to hold that the city was empowered with only ministerial
duties and could not make a "judicial" determination regarding the
bona fides of the signatures. Because no state agency is empowered
to investigate the validity of the signatures, the only protection
against fraudulent signatures is the self-restraint of the persons hav-
ing the strongest interest in having the petition declared legally suf-
ficient-the proponents of the referendum who circulate the petition.
This patently unsatisfactory situation could conceivably cause ref-
erendum elections to be called on petitions containing signatures of
nonresidents of the city, signatures of non-voters of the city, signa-
tures of persons who did not consent to have their signatures affixed
to the petition, and signatures of non-existent persons.28
In classifying the function of comparing the signatures on the
petition with the names on the voting register as "judicial," the court
relied on People ex rel. Wright v. Kelly,24 and Kerley v. Wetherell.25
In Kelly, decided by the Michigan Supreme Court, the petitioner
sought mandamus to compel the secretary of state to conduct an in-
dependant investigation of the petition to test the validiy of the
signatures. The Michigan constitution required that to the referen-
dum petition be attached an affidavit of the solicitor of signatures
stating that all signatures were made in his presence, that each signa-
ture was the genuine signature of the person signing, and that each
person was a qualified voter.2 The Michigan constitution further
21. Record, p. 27, City Comm'n of Albuquerque v. State ex rel. Nichols, 405 P.2d
924 (N.M. 1965).
22. Record, p. 94.
23. Cf. People ex rel. Wright v. Kelly, 294 Mich. 503, 293 N.W. 865 (1940).
24. 294 Mich. 503,293 N.W. 865 (1940).
25. 61 Idaho 31, 96 P.2d 503 (1939).
26. Mich. Const. art. 5, § 1.
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provided that after the petitions are verified in the foregoing man-
ner they shall be prima facie evidence that the signatures thereon are
genuine and that the persons signing the petitions are qualified elec-
tors.27 The Michigan court held that the duties of the secretary of
state were ministerial only, and that he could not make an independ-
ent investigation to supplement the detailed statutory authentication
of the validity of the signatures. 28 The holding in Kerley,2" by the
Supreme Court of Idaho, was similar to Kelly, under a comparable
statutory scheme.30 Both cases are distinguishable from the Nichols
decision, because the courts in Kelly and Kerley were confronted
with existing statutory provisions for verifying the genuineness of the
signatures independent of any investigation by an administrative of-
ficial. 3' In New Mexico there are no comparable statutory provisions
for checking the validity of the signatures. The city's attempt to ex-
amine the petition in Nichols involved comparing the signatures on
the petitions with names on the voting register to determine whether
the signatures complied with the laws; it was not a "supplemental"
investigation as in Kelly or Kerley.
The decision in Nichols is open to additional criticism because the
New Mexico Supreme court would not have acted without precedent
had it concluded that verification of the signatures by the city was
merely a "ministerial" function. In Truman v. Royer,3 2 the California
court stated that the duty of the city clerk to examine the individual
signatures to ascertain whether they comply with the law is purely
ministerial, not judicial. The Royer position does not conflict with
Kelly or Kerley because those courts were not faced with the ques-
tion whether initial verification was a "judicial" function.
Another state, Ohio, has a statutory procedure similar to that of
New Mexico. The Ohio referendum statute is silent regarding the
duty of the city,83 but the Ohio courts assume that the village clerk
and the city auditor have the authority, and are required to determine
the sufficiency of petitions, because it is their duty to certify the peti-
27. Ibid.
28. 293 N.W. at 870.
29. 61 Idaho 31, 96 P.2d 503 (1939).
30. Boise city, Idaho, Charter § 16(a) (3) (1927), cited in Kerley v. Wetherell,
supra note 29.
31. The provisions of the Michigan constitution in Kelly, and the provisions of the
Boise City charter in Kerley.
32. 189 Cal. App. 2d 240, 11 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1961). Accord, Baroldi v. Donni, 19
Cal. App. 2d 472, 17 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1961).
33. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 731.29 (Page, 1963).
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tion to the deputy state supervisors of electionsA4 At least two com-
mentators on the Ohio approach would take issue with the Nichols
decision on whether the function of determining the sufficiency of the
petition is ministerial or involves a judicial determination of fraud or
bad faith on the part of the solicitors of the petition; they conclude
that the prevailing view is that the task is ministerial."
Had the New Mexico Supreme Court in Nichols held the city's
function to be ministerial, however, the city, under the repealed
statutes86 and the Albuquerque City Charter,87 had no reliable yard-
stick with which to make such an examination. Two essential stan-
dards by which to determine the sufficiency of the petition were mis-
sing. First, there was no definition of a qualified voter, and second,
there was no definite standard by which to calculate the number of
signatures required on the petition. The repealed statute required
that the petition be signed by twenty per cent of the "qualified vot-
ers," but the statute failed to define this term. 8
The 1965 New Mexico legislature enacted a new referendum
statute as a part of the Municipal Code.8 9 Although the provisions
were enacted before the decision in Nichols, the new statute answers
some of the problems raised by that decision. The new Municipal
Code defines the term "qualified elector" as follows:
[A]ny person who is registered to vote in a general election precinct
established by the board of county commissioners, which is within or
34. State ex rel Kahle v. Rupert, 99 Ohio St. 17, 122 N.E. 39 (1918).
35. Fordham & Prendergast, The Initiative and Referendum at the Municipal Level
in Ohio, 20 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 313,336 (1951).
36. N.M. Laws 1919, ch. 121, art. 3, §§ 2, 3, set forth in full note 16 supra.
37. Albuquerque, N.M., Charter art. 3, § 2(a).
38. The problem raised by the requirement: Does twenty per cent of the qualified
voters mean twenty per cent of those registered to vote, or twenty per cent of those who
are qualified to vote if they register, or twenty per cent of those who actually voted at
the last election?
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-13-17 (Supp. 1965) provides:
A. If within thirty (30) days following the adoption of an ordinance or resolu-
tion, a petition, signed by the qualified electors in a number more than twenty
per cent (20%) of the average number of voters who voted at the previous four
(4) regular municipal elections or more than twenty per cent (20%) of the
number of voters who voted at the previous regular municipal election, which-
ever is greater, is presented to the commission asking that the ordinance or re-
solution in question be submitted to a special election for its adoption or rejection,
the ordinance or resolution shall become ineffective and the commission shall
provide for an election on the measure within sixty (60) days of the filing of
the petition. . ..
C. If an ordinance or resolution is an emergency measure, it shall go into effect
immediately, but it may be repealed by an adverse majority at a referendum
election.
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partly within the municipality, and who has resided within that
municipality for thirty (30) days preceding a municipal election. 40
As a matter of policy this definition may unduly restrict the number
of residents that could otherwise sign the petition. The residence
requirement states the individual must have resided within the
municipality for thirty days preceding a municipal election. Under
this requirement a person moving into the city after a general election
has occurred and who has also resided in the city for thirty days or
more preceding the circulation of the petition would be precluded
from signing the referendum petition because he had not resided in
the city for thirty days preceding a municipal election.
Another problem alluded to in Nichols," and answered by the
new Municipal Code, involves calculating the number of signatures
required for the petition. The petition must be "signed by the
qualified electors in a number more than twenty per cent (20 % ) of
the average number of voters who voted at the previous four . . .
regular municipal elections or more than twenty per cent . . . of the
number of voters who voted at the previous regular municipal elec-
tion, whichever is greater. ' 42 Although awkward, this provision
eliminates the uncertainty of its predecessor.4
Although the new legislation in the Municipal Code clears some un-
answered questions left by Nichols, it fails to solve the important
question of who has the duty to examine the individual signatures
for genuineness. Because the statute does not specifically set forth
procedures for verification or examination of the individual signa-
tures, the present statute will probably be construed like the statute
in Nichols was construed. The Nichols decision concluded, absent
specific legislation spelling out the duties of the city, that when pre-
sented with a petition sufficient on its face, the city's only duty was
to call an election.44 The effect of this holding is to read out of the
statute any safeguard that the petition will be signed by qualified elec-
tors.
As the New Mexico Supreme Court obliquely suggests, the solu-
tion to this problem is sound legislative draftsmanship. 45 The area
of primary concern is the determination of the sufficiency of the peti-
40. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-2(k) (Supp. 1965).
41. 405 P.2d at 929.
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-13-17 (Supp. 1965), set forth in note 39 supra.
43. See note 38 supra.
44. 405 P.2d at 930.
45. Ibid.
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tion, which is focused on determining the genuineness of the signa-
tures on the petition. This process of ascertaining the bona fides of
signatures can be accomplished by requiring first that the circulator
of the petition verify the signatures by affidavit .4  The affidavit
should state that the affiant ( 1 ) circulated that particular paper; (2)
observed the signatures being appended to it; (3) that each signa-
ture is the signature of the person it purports to be, and (4) state to
the best of his knowledge that the signer is a voter of the city. When
coupled with penalties for perjury, the affidavit requirement reduces
the possibility of names being signed by interested parties without the
knowledge or consent of those whose names were so appended. 7
The procedure for ascertaining the genuineness of signatures
should be supported by requiring the municipal clerk to examine the
sufficiency of the petition. The standard procedure adopted by
several states is to require the municipal clerk to examine the petition
within ten days of its submission, and to ascertain from voting records
whether or not the petition is signed by the requisite number of quali-
fied voters.48 This procedure eliminates the possibility of holding
expensive referendum elections perpetrated by the fraudulent or
irregular activities of organized minorities. Conversely, a require-
ment of verification by the city clerk would preclude the possibility of
the city's temptation to frustrate the referendum statute by unneces-
sarily delaying its examination.4
The new legislation in the Municipal Code raises a problem not
present in the repealed statutes. Under the new Municipal Code the
ordinance may become operative before the voters have an opportu-
nity to present a referendum petition. Even if the ordinance is later
the victim of a successful referendum, the statute is nonetheless bind-
ing for the period preceding repeal by referendum. This situation
did not exist under the repealed statute unless the ordinance was an
46. E.g., Cal. Elections Code § 4008; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 70-1-9 (1963).
47. People exrel. Wright v. Kelley, 294 Mich. 503, 293 N.W. 865, 870 (1940).
48. E.g., Cal. Elections Code § 4009; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 2-303 (1965) ; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 50-3905 (1947).
49. Cf. People ex rel. Wright v. Kerley, 294 Mich. 503, 293 N.W. 865, 870 (1940).
50. In the case of a non-emergency ordinance, the problem arises from an apparently
unintentional omission of a sentence in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-13-17 (Supp. 1965), that
was present in N.M. Laws 1919, ch. 121, art. 3, § 2(a). The ommitted sentence provided
that a non-emergency ordinance will not go into effect until thirty days after its passage.
Section 14-16-4(B) (Supp. 1965) provides that an ordinance shall not become effective
until five days after it has been published, or unless otherwise provided by law, and the
old Municipal Code contained essentially the same provision. N.M. Laws 1919, ch. 39,
§ 25. Consequently, the omission of the sentence may be construed to allow a non-
emergency ordinance to go into effect five days after publication.
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emergency measure. Because the repealed statute provided that the
ordinance would not go into effect until thirty days after its passage
(unless it was an emergency measure), the voters had an opportunity
to present a referendum petition within those thirty days. The re-
pealed statute also provided that if a valid petition were filed the
ordinance would be suspended pending the election."' In the case of
an emergency measure, the repealed statute was no different than the
new statutory framework. In the case of a true emergency measure,
however, the necessity of a prompt statutory remedy may be thought
to outweigh the temporary burdens of imposing the ordinance on
the voters before they have time to submit a petition. There is, of
course, a legislative tendency to indiscriminately add emergency
provisions to ordinances and statutes. 52
A related question is presented by the new statutes with respect to
the filing time of a referendum petition to repeal an emergency
ordinance. In Nichols, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded
that the thirty days allowed for filing the petition to repeal the
ordinance began running five days after publication.5" This holding
turned on the word "passage" in the now repealed statute's provision
that the voter would have thirty days after the passage of an ordi-
nance to present a referendum petition. The court in Nichols con-
cluded that "passage" meant the date upon which the ordinance
became effective.14 However, the new statute provides that the peti-
tioners shall present the petition within thirty days after "adoption"
of the ordinance.55 The word "adoption" may imply the time at which
the ordinance was voted upon by the city commission.
Legislative action is required to answer these filing time questions.
A simple statutory amendment can remedy the problem raised: allow
non-emergency ordinances to become effective thirty days after pub-
lication, and provide in the referendum statute that the petition must
be submitted within thirty days after publication of the ordinance.
The problem raised by the tendency of city commissions to tack
emergency provisions onto a multitude of ordinances is much more
difficult. In the case of a true emergency there is a real need for
expediting the statute's effective date. Perhaps the only way to
preserve the necessary power afforded by emergency ordinances,
51. See note 16 supra.
52. Note, Limitations on Initiative and Referendum, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 502 (1951).
53. 405 P.2d at 928.
54. Ibid.
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-13-17 (Supp. 1965).
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without some scheme for judicial review of the commission's deter-
mination of "emergency," 56 is to have the emergency measure bind-
ing until it is repealed.
With the New Mexico Supreme Court's present refusal to allow
the municipality to examine the sufficiency of the petition, the prob-
lem whether a good faith effort to obtain a legally sufficient petition
that fails for lack of a sufficient number of legally valid signatures
does not arise. New legislation, however, should consider the possibil-
ity.5 7 There seem to be few reasons why the petitioners' efforts
should fail by reason of invalid signatures, the validity of which
could be determined only by comparing the signatures with the voter
registration records to which the petitioners have no access. The con-
travening policy argument is that once given the statutory require-
ment of a signature by a qualified voter, the burden of providing
legally valid signatures is solely upon the petitioners. They should
bear the expense in time and effort for securing a sufficient petition
within the given time. However, considering the policy underlying
the referendum procedure, a liberal approach toward referendum is
justified. A finding by the city clerk of legal insufficiency for want of
the required number of valid signatures could be followed by grant-
ing the proponents of the petition an additional five or seven days to
secure replacement signatures.
As a device for expressing popular dissatisfaction with legislation,
referendum serves a valuable purpose in a democratic society. To
preserve the value of the referendum and initiative processes, and
to prevent their abuse, the statutes controlling these processes should
be carefully and thoughtfully drafted.
WALTER R. PARR
56. See, e.g., State v. Howell, 85 Wash. 294, 147 Pac. 1162 (1915), in which the
court refused to accept the legislative finding of an emergency as conclusive, but ac-
corded it the weight of a rebuttable presumption.
57. See Cal. Election Code § 4009.
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